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“Patriotism à la Carte”: Perceived Legitimacy of Collective Guilt 
and Collective Pride as Motivators for Political Behavior




Intergroup emotions motivate behavior, yet little is known about how people perceive these emotional experiences 
in others. In three experiments (Ns = 109, 179, 246), we show that U.S. citizens believe collective guilt is an 
illegitimate emotional motivator for ingroup political behavior, while collective pride is legitimate. This 
differential legitimacy is due to the perception that collective guilt violates the norm of group interest, while 
collective pride adheres to it; those who believe ingroup interests are more important than outgroups’ exhibited 
this illegitimacy gap. The perception that the intergroup emotion promoted ingroup entitativity mediated the 
relationship between emotion (pride vs. guilt) and legitimacy; this relationship was especially strong for those 
high in the belief in the norm of group interest. Collective guilt can have prosocial consequences, yet the 
perception that it is illegitimate may hinder such consequences from being realized.
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In his 2014 cover story for The Atlantic, “The Case for Reparations,” Ta-Nehisi Coates asks how 
Americans are to make sense of their country’s history, given the hundreds of years of anti-Black 
discrimination in the United States:
The last slaveholder has been dead for a long time. The last soldier to endure Valley Forge 
has been dead much longer. To proudly claim the veteran and disown the slaveholder is pa-
triotism à la carte… If Thomas Jefferson’s genius matters, then so does his taking of Sally 
Hemings’ body. If George Washington crossing the Delaware matters, so must his ruthless 
pursuit of the runagate Oney Judge.
Coates argues that if Americans wish to feel proud of their country’s moral and military successes, 
they must also grapple with the guilt associated with the United States’ failures in these areas. To 
wrap oneself in the former and delegitimize the latter, Coates argues, is to be selective in national 
memory. Discursive analyses reveal that politicians and citizens alike legitimize collective pride 
and delegitimize collective guilt, and some philosophers agree (e.g., Augoustinos & LeCouteur, 
2004; Clark, 2008). Our goal here is to experimentally examine two questions: Do people perceive 
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collective pride to be a more legitimate emotion than collective guilt as a basis for political actions? 
And if so, why? In line with research on intergroup emotions and self-categorization, we propose 
that U.S. citizens do find collective pride as more legitimate than collective guilt; we also propose 
that this is—at least in part—due to group members perceiving collective pride as protecting the 
interests of the group more than collective guilt. We review previous research supporting each of 
these propositions before presenting the studies.
Intergroup Emotions
Members of individualistic cultures—such as the United States—are used to thinking of emo-
tions as individual experiences and preferences. But people can have feelings due to the groups that 
they belong to—intergroup emotions (Mackie, Smith, & Ray, 2008). This is most likely when people 
categorize themselves in terms of their membership in a specific group instead of as an individual 
(Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). What intergroup emotion is felt depends on the 
group and context in which people self-categorize. In mid-November, an American might report fear 
and anger when they self-categorize as a Democrat if a Republican is elected president; this same 
individual might report excitement and happiness when self-categorizing as an Alabama football fan 
if their team is undefeated (see Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). Group membership generates inter-
group emotions either because individuals evaluate events in accordance with how those affect the 
group (not them as individuals) or because group members are influenced by and thereby come to 
feel what they believe other group members feel (Mackie et al., 2008; Reysen & Branscombe, 2008).
While people can feel emotions based on what is happening with their group contemporarily 
(e.g., Crisp, Heuston, Farr, & Turner, 2007; Rothschild, Landau, Molina, Branscombe, & Sullivan, 
2013) or in the future (Caouette, Wohl, & Peetz, 2012; Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010), we focus on 
emotions due to what their group has done in the past. A large body of research demonstrates that 
people feel emotions based on their group’s history (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004); for example, 
people can feel nostalgia for their nation’s history, even though they did not personally experience 
those times (e.g., Baldwin, White, & Sullivan, 2018; Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Martinovic, 2015). Two 
of the most investigated past-oriented intergroup emotions are guilt and pride.
Collective Guilt. People feel collective guilt when they self-categorize with a group that they 
consider responsible for wrongful behavior (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2014). The wrongful behavior 
often occurred before the participant was even born; for example, Dutch participants reported col-
lective guilt when reminded of the colonial history of the Dutch in Indonesia (Doosje, Branscombe, 
Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Collective guilt has a number of beneficial consequences for intergroup 
reconciliation. White American guilt predicts less anti-Black racism (Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 
2005); European Canadian guilt predicts greater willingness to apologize for policies that harmed 
Chinese immigrants (Wohl, Matheson, Branscombe, & Anisman, 2013); White South African guilt 
about apartheid predicts greater support for affirmative action policies; and collective guilt promotes 
support for reparations in a variety of contexts (e.g., Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Čehajić, 
2008; Imhoff, Bilewicz, & Erb, 2012; Schmitt, Miller, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2008). Another closely 
related, self-focused, and aversive emotion—that of collective shame—has been shown to have simi-
lar effects to collective guilt, including support for reparations (Brown et al., 2008; Gausel & Leach, 
2011). Consequently, we expect that observers will not differentiate between these two emotions.
Nevertheless, people are adept at avoiding the aversive experience of collective guilt (and 
shame) and the threat to positive social identity it entails. People can reduce their identification with 
the perpetrator group, minimize their group’s responsibility for the harm done, and legitimize the 
group’s harm to prevent feeling collective guilt (Branscombe, 2004; Ferguson & Branscombe, 2014; 
Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). It is far more likely that people willingly experience the positive 
emotion of collective pride.
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Collective Pride. This is, unsurprisingly, a widely felt emotion, particularly in the United States; 
81% of Americans report feeling “extremely” or “very” proud to be an American—and this rate is 
at a 15-year low (Jones, 2016). People feel collective pride when they self-categorize with a group 
that has an admirable quality or is responsible for admirable behavior (Liu, Lai, Yu, & Chen, 2014). 
National history is a potent resource from which to derive collective pride, as has been demon-
strated in the United States, Nordic countries, Eastern Europe, Canada, and Ghana, among others 
(Andrews, McGlynn, & Mycock, 2010; Evans & Kelley, 2002; McDonnell & Fine, 2011); history is 
often presented in textbooks to induce collective pride (Bromley, 2011; Foss, 2014; Nelson, 2002).
There is less research on the intergroup effects of feeling collective pride, but some research 
shows that it can be positively or negatively correlated with collective guilt and that it can facilitate 
positive or negative intergroup attitudes depending on the social context (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, 2014; 
Quin, 2010; Schori-Eyal, Tagar, Saguy, & Halperin, 2015; van Leeuwen, van Dijk, & Kaynak, 2013). 
However, our focus is not on the effects of feeling either collective guilt, shame, or pride; instead, 
we ask how people perceive others who reportedly experience these emotions. Are these emotions 
perceived to be equally legitimate experiences—particularly as a basis for political behavior?
The Illegitimacy of Guilt
People frequently conceptualize emotions in individualistic terms, and guilt is no exception. 
Many philosophers define guilt as a negative affective state that occurs when a person feels a sense 
of personal culpability for a wrongful act (Clark, 2008; Darby & Branscombe, 2014; Tollefsen, 
2006) and that individuals should not bear moral responsibility for the wrongful actions of a group 
(Darby & Branscombe, 2014; Tollefsen, 2006). From this perspective, feeling collective guilt is irra-
tional, and, if it is felt, it is only “metaphoric” guilt (Arendt, 2003, p. 28). For example, French (1998) 
argues that if all Americans are guilty of the My Lai massacre, then we must demonstrate how each 
and every American “contributed materially” to it (p. 5). People who bear no individual responsi-
bility for the My Lai massacre are not guilty, so it is irrational for them to feel guilty. Arendt (2003) 
takes this further in saying that it is morally wrong—or at least a “moral confusion”—to feel guilt on 
behalf of the actions of others, as it cheapens the blame on those who are personally culpable of the 
wrongful behaviors (p. 28). Political pundits’ moral panic about “preaching White guilt” in reaction 
to schools educating students about racial privilege or wrongful acts in American history provides a 
concrete example of collective guilt being seen as illegitimate (e.g., Salazar, 2016; Tancredo, 2016).
Yet, for the same reasons, people are not personally responsible for the admirable behaviors of 
groups they belong to either. Does this render collective pride illegitimate? Apparently the same logic 
does not apply: Tollefsen (2006) notes that feeling pride on behalf of the group is uncontroversial, 
while guilt is. Clark (2008) quotes a human rights activist in Serbia: “If we collectively take pride 
in the successes of our basketball players, for which we have no individual credit, are we entitled to 
reject the feeling of guilt for our ‘ethnic’ crimes in which we have not individually participated?” 
Clark says that this question is “based upon a flawed analogy… it is neither useful nor constructive 
to compare pride with guilt, since only the former can be vicarious” (pp. 670–671, emphasis ours). 
No reason is provided for why only pride can be vicarious.
Tollefsen (2006) claims that the notion that guilt requires personal culpability is commonsense 
among lay people. The only empirical evidence for this, to the best of our knowledge, is based on in-
terviews and discursive readings of political speeches. Augoustinos and LeCouteur (2004) examined 
Australian citizens’ arguments against apologizing for the human rights violations of the Australian 
government toward Indigenous Australians. Many argued that present generations should not have to 
accept the responsibility of past generations, obviating the possibility of feeling guilt. Others argued 
that history is in the past and people should focus on how things are in the present (see also Wetherell 
and Potter [1992] for analogous evidence in New Zealand and Klandermans, Werner, & van Doorn, 
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[2008] for evidence from South Africa). Augoustinos and LeCouteur (2004) also analyzed a speech 
from John Howard, then Australian prime minister, which employed many of the same rhetorical 
arguments repudiating the legitimacy of Australians feeling collective guilt. Howard explicitly men-
tioned both pride and guilt, saying that the “overwhelming majority of Australians [are] proud of 
what this country has achieved,” and that, “Australians of this generation should not be required to 
accept the guilt and blame for past actions and policies over which they had no control” (p. 254). 
Implicit here is that it is legitimate to feel pride for the ingroup’s historical actions that one had noth-
ing to do with, but it is illegitimate to feel guilt for them. The first goal of the present research is to 
demonstrate experimentally that people believe feeling collective pride for ingroup historical events 
and achievements is more legitimate than feeling collective guilt. Our second goal is to investigate 
why people have these perceptions.
Group Interest and Entitativity
We argue that group members find collective pride more legitimate than collective guilt because 
the latter violates the norm of group interest, while the former adheres to it. Social psychology has 
long demonstrated that people favor their ingroup over outgroups (e.g., Sherif & Sherif, 1969; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986). This is not only a descriptive norm, but also a prescriptive one: Members feel obli-
gated to act in their group’s best interest (Montoya & Pittinsky, 2012; Tajfel, 1970; Wildschut, Insko, 
& Gaertner, 2002). Wildschut et al. (2002) name this phenomenon the “norm of group interest,” 
“which dictates that one should take into account the interest of one’s own group before taking into 
account the interest of other groups” (p. 976). In a prisoner’s dilemma game, participants were more 
competitive with outgroup members (“Group B”) when ingroup members (“Group A”) were present 
or provided social support (Wildschut et al., 2002). Students allocated less money to a rival school 
when primed to think competitively towards them, and this was especially the case for those who 
endorsed the norm of group interest (Montoya & Pittinsky, 2012).
We predict that people who endorse the norm of group interest will perceive collective pride as 
more legitimate than collective guilt, but those who do not endorse this norm will perceive the emo-
tions as equally legitimate. We argue that this is because people see collective pride as promoting 
ingroup entitativity, which fosters group interest; conversely, collective guilt harms ingroup entita-
tivity, undermining group interest.
Entitativity refers to a group’s perceived unity, cohesion, and consistency (Campbell, 1958; 
Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Lickel et al., 2000). High entitativity provides group members with a 
number of benefits: promoting group esteem (Bougie, Usborne, de la Sablonnière, & Taylor, 2011; 
Reysen, Katzarska-Miller, Nesbit, & Pierce, 2013; Sani, Bowe, & Herrera, 2008), increasing iden-
tification with the ingroup (Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003), managing existential terror 
(Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002), among others (e.g., Crawford & Salaman, 2012).
For the present research, the most notable benefit is that people perceive entitative groups as es-
pecially capable of carrying out the group’s interests. Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, and Paladino (2000) 
proposed that “group members experience an entitative ingroup as being in a better position to act 
upon its agenda than a less entitative group” (p. 286). Indeed, high entitative groups are perceived as 
more capable of achieving their interests than low entitative groups (Callahan & Ledgerwood, 2016; 
Clark & Thiem, 2015; Clark & Wegener, 2009; Rydell & McConnell, 2005); additionally, strong 
arguments are assumed to have come from more entitative groups than weak arguments (Clark & 
Wegener, 2009). Arguments from high entitative groups elicit more effortful thought; so strong ar-
guments from these groups are more persuasive than similar arguments from low entitative groups 
(Clark & Thiem, 2015; Clark & Wegener, 2009; Rydell & McConnell, 2005).
People are apprehensive about whether entitative groups might harm the ingroup. Newheiser 
and Dovidio (2015) showed that people are more likely to aggress against members of a highly 
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entitative rival political party, but only if those members could not retaliate, presumably because the 
highly entitative group members would be more capable of retaliating successfully. High entitative 
outgroups—compared to low entitative ones—are worrisome, because they are seen as especially 
capable of harming the ingroup (e.g., Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998; Yzerbyt et al., 2000).
Ingroup entitativity leads members to believe that the group’s interests are more likely to be 
met. We hypothesize that people who strongly subscribe to the norm of group interest—compared 
to those who do not—see collective pride as promoting ingroup cohesion better than collective guilt 
because these people are particularly attuned to looking for ingroup members who are helping (or 
harming) the ingroup. This sense of perceived entitativity supportiveness should, in turn, lead people 
to see collective pride as more legitimate than guilt.
The Current Studies
We tested these hypotheses in three studies with American participants, using the United States 
as the relevant ingroup. We tested whether collective pride was seen as a more legitimate collective 
emotion than collective guilt in Study 1, while also considering other positive and negative collective 
emotions (i.e., anger, sadness, happiness). In Study 2, we investigate whether this effect depends on 
how much group members subscribe to the norm of group interest, predicting that those high in the 
belief that the ingroup’s interests are paramount—compared to those low in this belief—would per-
ceive collective guilt as less legitimate than pride. We then examine the role of entitativity in Study 3, 
testing the hypothesis that those high in the norm of group interest would be especially likely to see 
collective pride as promoting ingroup entitativity more so than collective guilt, which in turn would 
result in the perception that collective pride is the more legitimate emotion.
STUDY 1
We hypothesized that collective pride is perceived as a more legitimate motivation for political 
behavior than collective guilt. We chose political behavior as the consequence of these emotions 
because they are frequently tied to political agendas (e.g., Augoustinos & LeCouteur, 2004). Since 
pride is a positive emotion and guilt a negative one, we also tested the perceived legitimacy of hap-
piness, anger, and sadness at the collective level to experimentally address the effects of valence.
Methods
We recruited 116 introductory psychology students to participate in groups of one to five peo-
ple. We excluded four people who showed evidence of random responding or not taking the survey 
seriously, two people due to missing data, and one person who met both exclusion categories. We 
conducted all analyses on the remaining 109 participants. Participants were 45% female, 81% White, 
and averaged 19.34 years old (SD = 1.72, range 18 to 32).
Participants read about five individuals who were motivated to take political action, each motivated 
by a different collective emotion. Since participants might have inferred different political behaviors 
from the different types of emotions, we told participants specifically what types of political behavior 
these individuals were engaging in: campaigning for the candidates and policies that they prefer and 
registering to vote for the first time. Participants were told that each person was motivated to partici-
pate due to a different emotion about “what has happened throughout American history.” Participants 
read about all five people, each of whom was motivated by pride, happiness, anger, sadness, or guilt. 
Participants read about these people in a randomized order, creating five within-subject conditions.
Perceived legitimacy of emotions. For each target who was described as feeling a specific col-
lective emotion, we asked participants to indicate how much they agreed with four questions on a 
7-point scale: “[Emotion] is a legitimate motivator for being more involved in politics”; “[Emotion] 
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is a genuine motivator for political beliefs”; “[Emotion] is a foolish reason to have certain political 
attitudes”; and “One shouldn’t be motivated to participate simply because they feel [emotion].” The 
last two of these items were reverse-scored, and all four items were averaged together to measure the 
perceived legitimacy of each collective emotion (.80 < αs < .86).
Perceived political identification of target. We also asked participants how much they believed 
each target was liberal (1) to conservative (7) and Democrat (1) to Republican (7). These scores were 
averaged together to measure perceived political identity, with high scores indicating more perceived 
right-wing identification of the target (.67 < rs < .81).
Political and national identity. We asked participants their own political identification using the 
same two political identification questions (r = .79, p < .001). Lastly, we measured national identity 
with four items: “I often think of myself as an American”; “Being American is important to me”; “I 
am glad that I am an American”; “and “I find the sight of the American flag very moving” (α = .89).
Results
Perceived legitimacy of emotions. We tested if participants saw significant differences in the le-
gitimacy of feeling the five collective emotions using a one-way, within-subjects analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). This analysis was significant, F(4,432) = 35.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .25. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that all emotions differed from one another in perceived legitimacy, p < .010, except for 
anger and happiness, p = .527 (Figure 1). Pride was the most legitimate collective emotion, and guilt 
was the least.
Perceived political identification of target. We submitted perceived political identification 
scores to the same ANOVA, which was significant, F(4,432) = 14.08,
Figure 1. Pride is perceived as the most legitimate collective emotion for motivating political behavior; guilt is seen as the 
least legitimate (Study 1). Columns that have different superscripts have significantly different means, which are reported 
just below the superscripts.
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ηp2 = .12. Pairwise comparisons revealed that pride (M = 4.68, SD = 1.34) and anger (M = 4.32, 
SD = 1.52) were rated most conservative, and about equally so, p = .083. Guilt (M = 3.56, SD = 1.17), 
sadness (M = 3.64, SD = 1.00), and happiness (M = 3.78, SD = 1.27) were each rated as less con-
servative than pride and anger, ps < .020. Guilt, sadness, and happiness were perceived as equally 
nonconservative, ps > .21.
Perceived legitimacy, political identification, and national identification. We also correlated 
perceived legitimacy of specific emotions with participants’ own political and national identifica-
tion. Correlations revealed that conservatism predicted greater legitimacy of pride, r = .28, p = .003, 
less legitimacy of sadness, r = −.20, p = .041, and guilt, r = −.17, p = .073. National identification 
predicted greater perceived legitimacy of pride, p = .39, p < .001 and happiness, r = .16, p = .097. No 
other correlations were significant, ps > .11.
Discussion
People perceived collective pride as a more legitimate emotional motivator for other political 
action than collective guilt. This did not appear to be a function of emotion valence, as a mixture of 
positive and negative collective emotions were perceived as not as legitimate as pride but more legit-
imate than guilt. Given targets were motivated to participate in politics, we also measured the per-
ceived political orientation of the target: The person feeling collective pride was judged to be more 
conservative than the target feeling collective guilt. Participants’ own conservatism and national 
identification predicted increased legitimacy of collective pride. These exploratory analyses pro-
vided evidence to include participant political and national identification as covariates in subsequent 
studies. In Studies 2 and 3, we investigated the process by which people believe collective pride is a 
more legitimate emotional motivator for political behavior than collective guilt.
STUDY 2
We hypothesized that collective pride is more legitimate because it adheres to the norm of group 
interest, whereas collective guilt flouts it. We predict that those high in adherence to the norm of 
group interest will display the pride-guilt legitimacy gap, while those low in the norm will not.
We also sought to examine the perception of collective shame. Negative aspects of one’s in-
group can elicit collective guilt and collective shame, both aversive intergroup emotions. One of the 
primary differences between the two is the controllability of the antecedent: Collective guilt is felt 
when reminded of controllable aspects of an ingroup, while collective shame is elicited by the sa-
lience of uncontrollable aspects of an ingroup (Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004). Collective 
guilt is about what the group has done, while collective shame is about how the group is or what has 
happened to the group. We tested if people perceive this theoretical difference in volition and if these 
emotions differ in their perceived legitimacy.
Methods
We recruited 180 people from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to participate in the study. 
We excluded one participant from all analyses because he did not identify as an American citizen. 
Participants were 50% female, 79% White, and averaged 37.38 years old (SD = 12.36, range 18 to 
66).
Participants read about one individual who is politically active for the first time, using the same 
description of behaviors as Study 1. Each participant was randomly assigned to read one of three 
reasons why this person was participating: pride, guilt, or shame about America’s past. Participants 
were then asked “what kind of events or topics in American history” they believed the target was 
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thinking about when the target felt the collective emotion. Participants were asked to write down 
these events or topics.
Volition. Participants indicated on a 7-point Likert scale their agreement with the following 
statements about the event or topic they just wrote about: “Americans were in control of this hap-
pening”; “This happened because of what Americans did”; and “Americans wanted this to happen” 
(α = .76).
Image threat. Participants then responded to three questions gauging the threat to group image 
the topic or event they wrote about had: “Does this make America look good or bad?” (1 = very bad 
to 7 = very good), “Does this put America in a positive or negative light?” (1 = extremely negative 
to 7 = extremely positive), and “This threatens America’s positive image in the world” (1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree). We averaged these items together, reverse-scoring the first two items 
(α = .90) so that higher scores reflected greater threat to the ingroup’s image.
Legitimacy. The same four items were used to assess legitimacy of the emotion as in Study 1 
(α = .88).
Norm of group interest. Participants indicated on a six-item, 7-point scale how much they en-
dorsed the norm of group interest as it applied to the United States (Montoya & Pittinsky, 2012). An 
example item is: “I feel that most Americans expect that other Americans will do everything they 
can do to support America” (α = .81).
Political and national identity. We measured participants’ political identity the same as in 
Study 1 (r = .91, p < .001), and we used the first three items of the national identity scale from Study 
1 (α = .95).
Results
Volition. We first tested if people perceive the theoretical difference between guilt and shame—
that guilt involves volition on the part of the group, whereas shame does not. We submitted percep-
tions of group volition in the event participants wrote about a one-way, between-subjects ANOVA. 
There was a significant effect of condition (pride vs. shame vs. guilt), F(2,176) = 9.46, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .10. Pairwise comparisons revealed that events associated with collective pride (M = 5.71, 
SD = 0.90) were perceived as more volitional than both guilt (M = 4.97, SD = 1.23) and shame 
(M = 4.92, SD = 1.19), ps < .001. A planned contrast between guilt and shame revealed that partici-
pants perceived their antecedents as equally volitional, t(176) = 0.23, p = .818, d = .04 [−.32, .40].1 
For all subsequent analyses, we collapsed the guilt and shame conditions together.2
Image threat. Participants thought that guilt and shame (M = 5.41, SD = 1.17) threatened 
America’s image more than pride (M = 2.29, SD = 1.17), t(177) = 16.95, p < .001, d = 2.67 [2.26, 3.09].
Perceived legitimacy. We then tested if participants thought that guilt and shame were less 
legitimate motivators for political involvement than pride—a replication of our effect in Study 1. 
Participants thought that guilt and shame (M = 4.71, SD = 1.34) were less legitimate collective emo-
tions than pride (M = 5.20, SD = 1.26), t(177) = −2.34, p = .020, d = −.37 [−.68, −.06].
The role of norm of group interest. We predicted that people perceive pride as a more legitimate 
collective emotion than guilt and shame because feeling guilt and shame violates the norm of group 
interest. We tested this by seeing if the effect of collective emotion type on legitimacy would be 
strongest for those who highly endorsed the American norm of group interest. We accomplished this 
by using condition (0 = pride, 1 = guilt and shame), norm of group interest, and the interaction be-
tween the two to predict the perceived legitimacy of the collective emotion (mean-centering predic-
tors). The model was significant, R2 = .13, F(3,175) = 8.98, p < .001. The more participants perceived 
1All confidence intervals are at the 95% level.
2Results for primary hypotheses were the same in direction and significance when not collapsing guilt and shame 
together.
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a norm of group interest in America, the more legitimate they thought the emotion was (regardless 
of emotion), b = .30, SE = .11, t(175) = 2.85, p = .005; participants in the guilt and shame condition 
perceived the emotion as less legitimate, b = −.43, SE = .20, t(175) = −2.15, p = .033.
These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction, ΔR2 = .05, b = −.70, SE = .21, 
t(175) = −3.26, p = .001 (Figure 2). We probed this interaction by examining the effect of condition 
for those at −1 SD (low) and +1 SD (high) on perceived norm of group interest (Model 1; Hayes, 
2013). For those who perceived low norm of group interest in America, there was no effect of con-
dition, b = .20, SE = .28, t(176) = 0.72, p = .475. For those high in perceived norm of group interest, 
pride was seen as more legitimate than guilt and shame, b = −1.05, SE = .27, t(175) = −3.88, p < .001.
Ancillary analyses. In Study 1, we found that people who are motivated because of guilt are 
seen as less conservative than those motivated by pride; moreover, conservatism and national iden-
tity predicted less perceived legitimacy of guilt. Because the norm of group interest correlates with 
conservatism (r = .24, p = .001) and national identity (r = .53, p < .001), we tested the same condition 
by the norm of group-interest interaction after controlling for conservatism and national identity. 
The interaction remained significant, ΔR2 = .06, b = −.73, SE = .21, t(175) = −3.45, p < .001.
We also examined if threat to ingroup image might explain the relationship between type of 
emotion and legitimacy; we did this by testing the indirect effect of emotion type on legitimacy 
through image threat using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Model 4; Hayes, 2013) with 10,000 bi-
as-corrected bootstrap resamples. This indirect effect was not significant, −.09 [−.81, .62].
Discussion
Collective pride was seen as a more legitimate motivator of others’ political action than collec-
tive guilt and shame. Using a between-subjects design and sampling from a different population, 
we replicated the effect found in Study 1. This provides evidence that our effect in Study 1 was 
Figure 2. Pride is seen as a more legitimate collective emotion, but only for those high in norm of group interest (Study 2).
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not simply due to participants contrasting collective guilt and collective pride in a within-subjects 
design. We also found evidence supporting the hypothesis that this legitimacy gap is driven by the 
norm of group interest, as the effect was only found for participants who endorsed the norm that the 
ingroup’s goals take precedence over outgroups’ goals.
Although there is a theoretical distinction between collective guilt and collective shame for 
those who experience these emotions in terms of the controllability of the antecedent (Branscombe 
et al., 2004), our participants did not perceive this volitional difference, nor did it influence the 
perceived legitimacy of others’ acting on these emotions. This raises the possibility that the effects 
demonstrated for collective guilt in Studies 1 and 3 might also hold for collective shame, as well; re-
search on how people perceive collective guilt and collective shame is virtually nonexistent—and a 
promising route for future research. We also demonstrated that the role of the norm of group interest 
is not due to national or political identification and that threat to the ingroup’s image alone cannot 
explain the difference in legitimacy. In Study 3, we examine the role of entitativity supportiveness of 
the collective emotion in perceptions of legitimacy.
STUDY 3
We hypothesized that collective pride is seen as a more legitimate emotional motivator for polit-
ical action than collective guilt because those who adhere to the norm of group interest find the for-
mer to be more supportive of ingroup entitativity than the latter. Those who adhere to the norm that 
the ingroup’s goals are paramount should be especially likely to perceive collective pride as more 
entitativity supportive than collective guilt; since people perceive entitative groups as especially ca-
pable of achieving their goals (e.g., Clark & Thiem, 2015; Clark & Wegener, 2009), this entitativity 
supportiveness should in turn predict legitimacy of the intergroup emotion.
Methods
We recruited 250 people from MTurk to participate in the study. We excluded two participants 
for partial responding and two participants who did not identify as an American citizen. All analy-
ses were performed on the resulting sample of 246 participants. Participants were 46% female, 70% 
White, and averaged 33.60 years old (SD = 11.00, range 18 to 74). Participants from Study 2 were 
excluded from taking part in Study 3 (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016).
Participants first filled out the same norm of group interest scale (α = .79), political identity 
(r = .90, p < .001), and national identity (α = .95) questions as in Study 2. The procedure was the 
same as in Study 2, but participants were randomly assigned to either a pride or a guilt condition. 
Participants read about someone motivated to participate in politics for the first time because of 
either pride or guilt, wrote down what from American history they thought made the target feel that 
way, and then answered a brief questionnaire.
Image threat. We used the same three items as in Study 2 to assess ingroup image threat 
(α = .91).
Support for entitativity. We adapted items from various entitativity scales (e.g., Denson, Lickel, 
Curtis, Stenstrom, & Ames, 2006; Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, Hamilton, Peng, & Wang, 2007) to 
assess how much people perceived each emotion as promoting ingroup entitativity. Participants were 
asked 12 questions on a 1 (Definitely not) to 5 (Definitely yes) scale, each beginning with the stem, 
“Do feelings of [emotion] as an American…” Example items read: “…promote cohesion among 
Americans?” “…help Americans feel more similar to each other?” and “…promote common goals 
among Americans?” (α = .95).
Legitimacy. The same four items were used as in Studies 1 and 2 (α = .87).
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Results
Participants saw collective guilt as more threatening to the group image, promoting less ingroup 
entitativity, and less legitimate than collective pride (Table 1), replicating and advancing our findings 
from Studies 1 and 2. We hypothesized that participants whose belief in the norm of group interest 
is high would believe guilt promotes less entitativity and is more illegitimate than pride compared 
to those low in this belief. We tested these hypotheses by predicting each of the dependent variables 
from condition (0 = pride, 1 = guilt), norm of group interest, and the interaction between the two 
(mean-centering predictors). The interaction on both entitativity and illegitimacy were significant 
(Table 2). We probed both of these interactions by examining the conditional effects for those at −1 
SD (low) and +1 SD (high) on perceived norm of group interest (Model 1; Hayes, 2013).
Entitativity. Participants low in perceived norm of group interest thought that guilt was less 
entitativity supportive than pride, b = −.50, SE = .14, t(242) = −3.70, p < .001; this effect was larger 
for those high in this belief, b = −.92, SE = .14, t(242) = 6.76, p < .001 (Figure 3).
Legitimacy. Participants low in perceived norm of group interest saw guilt and pride as equally 
legitimate, b = −.30, SE = .25, t(242) = −1.17, p = .244; those high in this belief saw guilt as a less 
legitimate collective emotion than pride, b = −1.01, SE = .25, t(242) = −3.96, p < .001 (Figure 4).
Moderated mediation. We examined if the perceived entitativity-supportive nature of the col-
lective emotion mediated the relationship between collective emotion (0 = pride, 1 = guilt) and per-
ceived legitimacy of that emotion, especially for those high in belief in the norm of group interest. 
We accomplished this by running two separate linear regression models: First, we predicted entita-
tivity from condition, norm of group interest, and the interaction between the two; second, we pre-
dicted legitimacy of the emotion from entitativity, norm of group interest, condition, and the norm 
of group interest by condition interaction. Coefficients, indirect effects, and the index of moderated 
mediation (Hayes, 2015) were calculated using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Model 8; Hayes, 
2013) with 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap resamples.
As reported above, the norm of group interest by condition interaction on entitativity was sig-
nificant, p = .030. Predicting legitimacy from entitativity, norm of group interest, condition, and 
the interaction between norm of group interest and condition yielded only one significant predictor: 
perceived entitativity supportiveness of the collective emotion, b = .82, SE = .11, t(241) = 7.55, p < 
.001. The index of moderated mediation = −.20 [−.43, −.02], which indicated that participants’ belief 
in the norm of group interest significantly moderated the indirect effect of emotion condition on 
legitimacy through entitativity (Figure 5).
We probed this index of moderated mediation by examining the conditional indirect effects at 
−1 SD (low) and +1 SD (high) of norm of group interest. This revealed that the indirect effect was 
smaller for those low in norm of group interest (indirect effect = −.41 [−.69, −.20]) than for those high 
in this belief (indirect effect = −.75 [−1.12, −.47]).
Ancillary analyses. We again considered the role of political and national identity by controlling 
for each in the moderated mediation model. The index of moderated mediation remained significant 
even after controlling for political and national identity in both of the regression equations, −.19 
[−.42, −.01]. We also tested the indirect effect of condition on legitimacy through ingroup threat 
Table 1. Effect of Condition on Image Threat, Entitativity, and Legitimacy in Study 3
Guilt Pride t d 95% CI
Image Threat 5.38 (1.16) 2.54 (1.36) 17.65 2.25 [1.93, 2.57]
Entitativity 3.08 (3.08) 3.84 (3.84) 7.48 0.95 [0.69, 1.22]
Legitimacy 4.01 (1.52) 4.73 (1.36) 3.90 0.50 [0.24, 0.75]
Note. “Guilt” and “Pride” columns contain means, with standard deviations in parentheses. All t-tests significant, p < .001.
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using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Model 4; Hayes, 2013), with 10,000 bias-corrected bootstrap 
resamples. This indirect effect was again not significant, −.34 [−.81, .19].
Discussion
Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, collective pride was perceived as a more legitimate emotional 
motivator for political behavior than collective guilt. This effect was mediated by the perception that 
collective pride is more entitativity supportive than collective guilt. This indirect effect was particu-
larly strong for those who highly endorse the norm of group interest, as they saw collective pride as 
Table 2. Multiple Linear Regression Coefficients for Main Effects and Interactions in Study 3
Dependent Variable Predictor b SE t p
Entitativity Norm of Group 
Interest
.31 .06 5.59 < .001
Emotion Condition –.71 .10 –7.42 < .001
Interaction –.24 .11 –2.18 .030
Legitimacy Norm of Group 
Interest
.39 .11 3.68 < .001
Emotion Condition –.65 .18 –3.64 < .001
Interaction –.42 .21 –1.98 .049
Note. For both interactions, ΔR2 = .01.
Figure 3. Pride is seen as supporting ingroup entitativity more than guilt, and this effect is especially strong for those high 
in norm of group interest (Study 3).
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especially likely to support ingroup entitativity. We again ruled out the potential role of national and 
political identification in accounting for these effects, as well as ingroup image threat.
General Discussion
People differentially perceive the legitimacy of fellow ingroup members’ emotional motivations 
for political behavior, with a bias in favor of collective pride over collective guilt. We found this 
effect in both within- and between-subjects designs as well as in a laboratory student sample and 
online adult samples. The difference in valence of the two emotions does not appear to explain the 
Figure 4. Pride is seen as a more legitimate collective emotion than guilt, but only for those high in norm of group interest 
(Study 3).
Figure 5. The moderated mediation model tested in Study 3. The coefficient in parentheses is the total effect. All 
coefficients are unstandardized. The main effects of emotion condition and norm of group interest predicting support for 
entitativity and legitimacy of emotion were included in the equations but are not depicted here. *p < .05, **p < .001.
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legitimacy difference, as collective pride was seen as more legitimate than happiness, while collec-
tive guilt was less legitimate than anger and sadness (Study 1).
High endorsers of the norm of group interest—that the ingroup’s goals are privileged above 
outgroups’ goals—found collective pride as more legitimate than collective guilt, but this was not 
true for low endorsers (Study 2). We interpret this as evidence that collective pride is seen as more 
legitimate because it adheres to the prevailing norm of group interest (Wildschut et al., 2002). This 
interaction held even after controlling for political and national identification, which were related 
to both perceptions of legitimacy and norm of group interest, and threat to the ingroup’s image did 
not mediate the relationship between intergroup emotion type and perceived legitimacy as a political 
motivator. Future research should examine the roles of political partisanship and national identifica-
tion proper as well, as we treat them as control variables in the present analysis.
Entitative groups—groups that are cohesive, unified, with similar members—are seen as more 
efficacious than nonentitative groups; people perceive them to be more capable of acting on their 
group’s interests. We found that people perceive collective pride as more supportive of ingroup enti-
tativity than collective guilt or shame, and this was especially so for those high in the norm of group 
interest, as these people are particularly sensitive to cues that undermine group interests. Entitativity 
supportiveness of the emotion, in turn, predicted legitimacy of the emotion as a political motivator 
(Study 3). This model held after controlling for political and national identification, and the per-
ceived threat of the emotion poses to the ingroup’s image did not mediate the relationship between 
emotion type and perceived legitimacy.
Perceptions of Intergroup Emotions
The antecedents and consequences of experiencing intergroup emotions, particularly collective 
guilt, have been extensively researched (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2014; Mackie et al., 2008). Less 
is known, however, about how people perceive others’ intergroup emotions; the present research 
begins to examine these phenomena. How people perceive others’ intergroup emotions might have 
important implications for how people think about the consequences of those emotions. That peo-
ple—especially those who adhere strongly to the norm of group interest—perceive collective guilt as 
undermining entitativity and less legitimate than collective pride could have important implications 
for how people think about the consequences of these emotions.
Emotions are motivational states (Brehm, 1999), and collective guilt motivates reparative action 
for the ingroup’s past harm doing (e.g., Brown et al., 2008; Doosje et al., 1998; Imhoff et al., 2012). 
Indeed, our data do not suggest that collective guilt actually harms the ingroup; rather, we have 
documented a perceptual bias against others’ experiencing collective guilt. There are a number of 
cognitive tools people can use to keep themselves from feeling collective guilt (Branscombe, 2004; 
Wohl et al., 2006), but our question concerns how people deal with others feeling this emotion. Our 
data suggest that they are likely to frame the emotional experience as illegitimate. Future research 
might examine how undermining the legitimacy of feeling an intergroup emotion influences mes-
sages that reflect that emotion; does undermining the emotional experience that drives one’s efforts 
make them less persuasive? For example, one might simply write off a White American’s support 
and arguments for affirmative action policies as symptoms of a pathological “White guilt” that can 
easily be ignored once rendered “irrational.”
One might also examine the opposite: To what extent does bolstering the legitimacy of collec-
tive guilt increase the efficacy of political efforts that explicitly appeal to a sense of collective guilt? 
For example, the legitimacy of collective guilt might be bolstered by suggesting it will improve the 
ingroup’s identity in the eyes of third parties (i.e., that the ingroup is a moral group that accepts 
responsibility for correcting its past wrongs). To the extent that collective guilt can be portrayed as 
protecting the ingroup’s social identity, it may be seen as more legitimate and entitativity supporting.
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Since collective guilt is perceived to be less legitimate than collective pride, it is no surprise 
that efforts appealing to collective pride can be effective at improving outgroup attitudes compared 
to those appealing to collective guilt (van Leeuwen et al., 2013). Especially if psychologists wish to 
improve intergroup attitudes outside of the laboratory, it is important to study how individuals will 
perceive the emotional experiences such messages are designed to elicit. Since failing to do so might 
create efforts that backfire (e.g., Salazar, 2016), researchers may want to investigate further the con-
sequences of intergroup emotion perceptions.
Belonging to an Entitative Group
A number of studies have demonstrated the psychological benefits of belonging to an entitative 
ingroup (e.g., Bougie et al., 2011; Castano et al., 2003, 2002), but the idea that an entitative group is a 
particularly capable one has usually been examined within the context of perceiving outgroups (e.g., 
Abelson, et al., 1998; Yzerbyt et al., 2000). Our results suggest that people are motivated to foster 
ingroup entitativity because it increases the group’s competence, as people highly invested in the 
norm of group interest are especially sensitive to threats against entitativity.
Ingroup members who deviate from group norms are disliked more than outgroup members who 
do the same, and this is especially so when the ingroup’s public image is jeopardized (Branscombe, 
Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Marques & Paez, 1994). If feeling collective guilt violates the norm 
of group interest and threatens the entitativity of one’s group, ingroup members feeling collec-
tive guilt should be judged more harshly than outgroup members who feel similarly about their 
groups. Indeed, collective guilt may be seen as more legitimate for outgroup members to feel, as it 
would promote lower levels of outgroup entitativity, which can be threatening to the ingroup (e.g., 
Newheiser & Dovidio, 2015). For example, White Americans who feel guilty about slavery may be 
punished, while Chinese citizens who undermine their nation’s entitativity by feeling guilty about 
the Tiananmen Square protests are applauded.
Conclusion
We find evidence that Americans engage in “patriotism à la carte” (Coates, 2014) by finding 
collective pride a more legitimate emotion than collective guilt, and our data suggest this legitimacy 
difference serves to protect the group’s cohesion and agenda. Researchers, then, must not only inves-
tigate the antecedents and consequences of intergroup emotional experiences, but also how ingroup 
members perceive people who are driven by those emotions.
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